Rickenbacker, third from left, and fellow officers of the 94th Aero Squadron |
And then it was 11:00 A.M., the
eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. I was the only audience
for the greatest show ever presented. On both sides of no-man's-land, the
trenches erupted. Brown-uniformed men poured out of the American trenches,
gray-green uniforms out of the German. From my observer's seat overhead, I
watched them throw their helmets in the air, discard their guns, wave their
hands. Then all up and down the front, the two groups of men began edging
toward each other across no-man's-land. Seconds before they had been willing to
shoot each other; now they came forward. Hesitantly at first, then more
quickly, each group approached the other.
Suddenly
gray uniforms mixed with brown. I could see them hugging each other, dancing,
jumping. Americans were passing out cigarettes and chocolate. I flew up to the
French sector. There it was even more incredible. After four years of slaughter
and hatred, they were not only hugging each other but kissing each other on
both cheeks as well.
Star
shells, rockets and flares began to go up, and I turned my ship toward the
field. The war was over.
In memoirs,
diary entries, and letters, we find that for the fighters of the First World
War, the Great thing about the War was its end. In victorious countries,
schools let out, impromptu parades and rallies erupted. These outbursts
recognized victory, to be sure, but they chiefly celebrated the end of the war.
My own grandmother recounted to me, more than once and each time luminously, the
Armistice celebration in Philadelphia |
In the
defeated countries, people at home were, if more subdued, at least relieved for
the end, but they were also incredulous that they had lost when only days
before, the newspapers had proclaimed they were winning. Above all, they were
apprehensive about what was to come. Spontaneity among the vanquished was more often
a matter of revolution, strikes, and mutinies, often accompanied by gun battles
in the streets of Berlin, Budapest, and other cities, as revolutionary groups clashed
with each other and with returning soldiers. Of course, some ten or eleven
million dead soldiers and sailors would never return to join in the joy or the
revolt on either side. Nor would the eight million civilian dead of the war be rejoining
their loved ones in any country.
But the shooting
war was in some ways hardly over. The Russian Civil War raged. Sixteen
countries, including the United States, invaded Russia to try to shape the
outcome of the brutal Russian war. The Greek army invaded Turkey. Poland fought
a regular war with the Soviets in 1920. Large-scale violence scarred postwar
societies in Ireland, on the German-Polish border, in the Middle East. And the
British maintained the Hunger Blockade on Germany for many more hungry months.
Nor was the
notable wartime inflation at an end. This massive transfer of wealth by
belligerent governments through inflation impacted both winners and losers.
Immediately after the war, inflation escalated to society-bludgeoning
hyperinflation in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Austria, and the Soviet Union, creating
heightened poverty and misery.
Yet the
elites of the war, especially those on the winning side, were already taking
advantage of the war's drastic restructuring of international affairs and
domestic politics to plan for "the salvation of the empire," or
economic hegemony, or control of vast supplies of raw materials and fuel, or
"greater" Serbia (or Greece, or Poland, or Romania), or "a new
diplomacy." Intellectuals in the victorious countries likewise saw the war
as the "fulfillment" of domestic and social goals, a subject which
Murray Rothbard has analyzed in detail. Above all,
the international banking houses (many of them connected intimately with the
armaments industry (which had lobbied for, sponsored, and organized the complex
loans for "modernization" before 1914, and for war loans thereafter)
looked forward to the fees and the financial power which the interwoven loans
of billions presented. The famous scheme of reparations from Germany and Austria
enshrined in the Paris Peace would
emerge from American banking agents on the Finance Committee at the Paris Peace
Conference. Before long, New York banks would be loaning billions to Germany so
that it could pay billions in reparations to Britain, France, and Belgium, so
that they could repay millions in war debt to U.S. banks.
Nor would
the statist total war systems that had in some degree marked all the
belligerents cease at on the eleventh day of the eleventh month. The most
extreme of these systems--in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany--would
produce a new phenomenon, totalitarianism, which would reek havoc with the
lives of millions in their own countries and with those of many others throughout the twentieth century
and beyond. And even among the previously liberal regimes, total war social and
political organization would extend in many ways into the future.
Matthias Erzberger in 1919. Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1989-072-16 / Kerbs, Diethart / CC BY-SA 3.0 DE |
But little
of all this could be foreseen as the German Armistice representative, Matthias
Erzberger, made his way to the Forest of Compiègne in November 1918, with a
little band of Germans commissioned with ending the fighting.
Erzberger
was the leader of the Progressive branch of the German Center Party, the
political party of German Catholics. Early in the war, Erzberger was as
enthusiastic about "fulfillment" of German dreams through war as most
German politicians were. But he came to see that the aggressiveness of all
sides, including the German reintroduction of unlimited submarine warfare, was
producing an unlivable world. He managed to push a Peace Resolution through the
German parliament in mid-1917, calling for peace negotiations. But the
chancellor (a front man for the military dictatorship of Hindenburg and
Ludendorff) had been able to rob the Resolution of any meaning. Yet by August 1918, the German High Command was
demanding that civilian politicians save Germany by making peace, by ending the
war which the generals and imperial bureaucrats had lost. A liberal prince from
Baden assembled a moderately liberal cabinet (including Erzberger) at the
beginning of October and sent messages to Woodrow Wilson, proposing cease-fire
negotiations on the basis of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points peace proposal
from the previous January. Wilson hesitated, since the Allies were now driving
the Germans from their positions on the Western Front. But at last the Allies
agreed to talk. A highly reluctant Erzberger was appointed head of a negotiating team which
he assembled hastily: a brigadier general, an upper diplomat, a naval officer,
and two translators.
Foch, with cane, and his Compiegne team. |
The small
group drove--yes drove--to the trench lines, reaching the French outposts in
darkness on the evening of November 7, and by the middle of the night had been
conducted through the desert of the Western Front to a train at Tergnier, south
of St. Quentin. The train conveyed the Germans over the thirty miles to the
middle of the Forest of Compiègne. A French railway car soon arrived, carrying
the Allied Commander-in-Chief, French Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch and British
First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Weymyss, and their staffs.
In the
morning, Erzberger and his small group walked to the French railway car. Foch
and Weymyss appeared. Foch asked, "What do you want of me?" And the three-day
conversation began. Before Erzberger had left Germany, Chancellor Max of Baden
had written to Erzberger, "Obtain what mercy you can, Matthias, but for
God's sake make peace." This Erzberger proceeded to do, though Foch
refused to budge on any issue. Erzberger wired Berlin that the terms were
draconian, essentially disarming the German military and providing for Allied
occupation of all German territory west of the Rhine. Berlin replied: accept
the terms. Erzberger did so, and the Armistice was arranged for November 11, at
11:00 French time. Diplomats from the Allied countries immediately started
making arrangements to gather in Paris in January for the peace conference.
On
reflection, as Paul Fussell made clear in his masterpiece, The Great War and Modern Memory, the multi-layered ironies of the
conflict created the war's most lasting legacies. And none of the ironies was
quite as striking as the fact that those groups of politicians, bureaucrats,
generals, and bankers on all sides who created the war and directed it, had had
a mortality rate of zero, more or less, at least until the Spanish Flu emerged
late in the war to kill with a little less social and demographic selectivity.
It is
fitting to end this short contemplation of November 11, 1918, with a song that
emerged from the soldiers who fought the war, performed here in a recent recording
by a modern musical organization that thrives on ironies, both present and
past, the Ukulele Orchestra of Great Britain. The performance is a spare and
thoughtful rendition of a British soldier's ditty from the war, "Hanging
on the Old Barbed Wire," a reference to that little-celebrated fate of
Great War fighters who made it to the killing zone of the enemy's barbed wire
in No Man's Land, only to be killed by the interlocking machine gun fire which
everyone knew would be zeroed in on that simple but effective obstacle.
If you want to find the General
I know where he is.
He's pinning another medal on his chest.
I saw him, I saw him,
Pinning another medal on his chest
If you want to find the Colonel
I know where he is.
He's sitting in comfort stuffing his bloody gut.
I saw him, I saw him,
Sitting in comfort stuffing his bloody gut.
If you want to find the Seargent
I know where he is.
He's drinking all the company rum.
I saw him, I saw him,
Drinking all the company rum.
If you want to find the private
I know where he is.
He's hanging on the old barbed wire.
I saw him, I saw him,
Hanging on the old barbed wire,
Hanging on the old barbed wire.
Like many
soldiers' perceptions, this simplistic view did not tell the whole truth (in
most armies, lieutenants died at a higher rate than privates since they led the
attacks "over the top," for example) and it did not extend to the
political and economic structures which created the war to begin with. The
German sailors in Kiel, who had by early November already started the German
Revolution of 1918 by carrying out a mutiny at the Kiel naval base, understood
only peace. And they called for it in the shorthand expression: "We want
Erzberger!" (And a footnote. Matthias Erzberger would pay dearly for his
courageous call for peace negotiations and his grim duty in carrying out the
first step: he was assassinated by an ultra-nationalist terrorist group in
1921.)
Yet there
was a kernel of truth in the cynical but simplistic perceptions of many Great
War soldiers. The personal bravery and the sacrifices on all sides belonged
chiefly to the soldiers. The postwar costs would be paid by societies which had
had little to do with bringing about the massacres. The victory was in the
hands of gentlemen in ornate rooms in the financial and political capitals of
the "great powers," the representatives of the modern state, an
entity which collectively perceived the results of the war as its own
fulfillment.
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